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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A rst-price
multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a read-
justment of (all) submitted o¤ers before the o¢ cial opening. The agent may be corrupt, i.e. willing
to sellhis decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agents in-
centives to extract rents are closely linked with that of a cartel of bidders. First, collusive bidding
conveys value to the agents decision power. Second, self-interested abuse of discretion to extract
rents (corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bid-
ding can facilitate collusion. We also nd that with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions
where rms are small relative to the market. Our main message to auction designers, competi-
tion authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed
simultaneously. Some other policy implications for the design of tender procedures are discussed.
Keywords: auction, corruption, collusion.
JEL: D 44, H 57, K 42.
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1 Introduction
Recent advances in auction theory allow obtaining deep insights into the design of complicated
selling schemes in di¤erent environments (Krishna (2002), Milgrom (2004)). Yet, major problems of
real-life auction mechanisms received only limited attention in the theoretical literature. Klemperer
(2002) argues that collusion between bidders should be a major concern for auction designers. In
this paper, we investigate how a collusive agreement can be sustained in the presence of a corrupt
auctioneer. The main motivation for the paper is a mounting body of evidence that collusion and
corruption often go hand in hand in public procurement.2
In France, practitioners and investigators in courts of accounts, competition authorities, and in
the judiciary have long been aware of close links between collusion and corruption in public tenders.
The spectaculartestimony of J. C. Mery provides suggestive evidence of such links (Le Monde,
September 22 and 23, 2000).3 A recent judgment in the Les Yvelinnes case (Cour dAppel de
Versaille, January 2002) provides a vivid illustration as well. Detailed evidence revealed the ways
in which corrupt politicians and procurement o¢ cials use to initiate and arbitrate collusion in the
allocation of maintenance and construction contracts. Finally, according to a judge investigating
a major corruption case in Paris, it is a rare exception that a large stake collusion in public
procurement in France goes without corruption.4
Besides empirical evidence, there are theoretical issues motivating the study of links between
collusion and corruption. First, any cartel must solve a series of problems including agreeing how
to share the spoils, securing enforcement, and deterring entry (see McAfee and McMillan, 1992).
A corrupt auctioneer can contribute to solving some of these problems, e.g. by providing means
of retaliation to secure enforcement or creating barriers to entry. Second, corrupt auctioneers
might seek to extract rents. Certain provisions in auction rules may provide them with ample
opportunities to support collusion in order to create rents that they can appropriate.
2Although our focus in this paper is on public procurement, the theory could be applied to private procurement
as well.
3J. C. Mery, a City Hall o¢ cial, left a video tape as he died. On the tape he desribes how under ten years
(1985-94) he organized and arbitrated collusion in the allocation of construction and maintenance contracts for the
Paris City Hall. In exchange, rms were paying bribes used to nance political parties. The contracts in question
were on average very protable: they generated up to 30 percent prot in an industry that averages 5 percent. Mr.
Mery also claimed that he had always managed to allocate the contracts to the lowest price bidder. Both these
features suggest that the rms were not competing with each other, but were instead implementing some kind of
market sharing agreement.
4The case concerns the procurement of a 4.3 billion euros construction market (see Le Monde, January 26, 2000):
1
We show that in a one-shot rst-price multiple-object auction corruption can induce collusive
market-sharing. The reason is that the auctioneer, who acts as an agent for the public interest,
often has discretion to let rms simultaneously readjust their bids. If the auctioneer is honest,
this provision does not create any ine¢ ciency. If the auctioneer is corrupt, collusion becomes
sustainable. The basic intuition is that a defection from collusive bidding creates an opportunity
for the auctioneer to extract rents by abusing his right to let rms readjust their o¤ers. When he
exploits this opportunity, the auctioneer e¤ectively makes defection less protable.
In practice, formal procedures in procurement often include various provisions that allow the
auctioneer to intervene during the tendering process, e.g., when a new information becomes avail-
able, to correct an undue informational advantage or to clear a tender document from an ambiguity.
Upon such an intervention, bidders are allowed to readjust submitted bids; the submission deadline
might be extended. The World Bank guidelines Procurements under IBRD loans and IDA credits
specify that Additional information, clarication, correction of errors or modication in bidding
documents shall be sent to each recipient of the original bidding documents in su¢ cient time before
the deadline. If necessary the deadline shall be extended.article 2.18.5
The second result of our paper is that with corruption the gains from a more exible bidding
procedure may be outweighed by an increased risk of collusion: package bidding can facilitate
collusion. With bids on individual tasks only, the enforcement power of corruption is much more
limited. This result is in contrast with the recent emphasis on advantages of package bidding.6
Finally, our analysis predicts that collusive market-sharing is more likely to occur in auctions
where rms are small relatively to the market. This is because the corrupt auctioneers self-interest
to deter defection implies an unusual role for the cartels threat equilibrium: the larger is the
threat payo¤s, the easier it is to deter defection.
A central message to auction designers and procurement agencies emerges from the analysis:
risks of collusion and risks of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. This approach is
recommended when dealing with the ne details of the procedural design regulating the auctioneers
role as well as when dealing with more profound auction rules such as the choice of the bidding
language.
In our theoretical model, we consider a sealed-bid multiple-object rst-price auction with pack-
5To secure fair treatment, when the deadline is extended, those who have already submitted are allowed to submit
a new bid.
6See, e.g., Cybernomics (2000), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), and Ausubel, Cramton and Milgrom (2005).
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age bidding. There is an ine¢ cient public rm (the government) and n private rms. Following
Bernheim and Whinston (1986), we assume symmetric information among bidders. The auctioneer
has some discretion with regard to the procedure. On the basis of a private signal, he decides
whether or not to extend the deadline for submission so that the participating rms can readjust
their o¤ers. In the absence of corruption, any equilibrium is characterized by price competition
between private rms. We then assume that before the o¢ cial opening, the auctioneer can disclose
the submitted o¤ers to some bidders, and invite them to compete in bribes for the right to decide
on the deadline.
We show that the e¤ect of corruption is to impose a cost on defection from collusive bidding.
The defector must outbid (in bribes) a rm whose collusive bid he displaced in order to avoid an
extension of the deadline, which would trigger non-cooperative bidding. When the bribe needed to
outbid any displaced bidder is su¢ ciently high, defection is deterred. Essentially, the sustainability
of collusion is due to the opportunities to observe current action (submitted o¤ers) and to react
to them.7 A contribution of this paper is to show that a combination of the corrupt auctioneers
self-interest and a common form of discretion provides these opportunities.
In the package auction, defection from a collusive bidding prole implies that a displaced bidder
earns zero payo¤: his stake in the right to decideis equal to his competitive payo¤. In contrast, in
an auction with single-item bidding , a defection from a collusive market-sharing scheme typically
would not reduce to zero any other bidderspayo¤s, i.e. no rm is fully displaced. No rm may
therefore be willing to pay much to revert to a low-payo¤ competitive equilibrium. As a result,
corruption may not su¢ ce to deter defection, and collusion fails. Our results are consistent with
early conjectures that package bidding may facilitate collusion (e.g., CRA 1998). To the best of
our knowledge, a more formal argument was made in connection to the second-price auction only.8
While there exists a signicant body of theoretical literature on collusion in auctions initiated
by Graham and Marshall (1987) and McAfee and McMillan (1992), corruption in auctions has
become a focus of economistsinterest only recently. The rapidly growing literature distinguishes
between two types of corruption. The rst type of corruption, often referred to as favoritism
in the economic literature, corresponds to cases when an auctioneer biases competition by o¤ering
a preferential treatment to some rm (e.g. La¤ont and Tirole, 1993, Burguet and Che, 2003 and
2004, Celentani and Ganunza, 2002). The second type of corruption targets competition per se:
7 If both those opportunities are present in the auction procedure, collusion can be sustained without corruption.
Such situation might arise in a sequential auction where the auction ends when no new bid is submitted.
8 In a single auction context, collusion can be sustained in weakly dominated strategies
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the abuse of discretion makes collusion sustainable (Compte et al, 2005). They show that in a rst-
price single object auction conducted by a corrupt auctioneer, collusion may obtain in equilibrium.
The auctioneer provides one rm with an illegal opportunity to secretly resubmit a bid in exchange
for a bribe. A key feature in the model is that the competition in bribes for the opportunity to
secretly resubmit a bid is imperfect. In contrast, our results do not rely on any imperfection in the
bribe competition. Also, our focus is on the role of legal provisions in procurement: (i) procedures
that imply e¤ective discretion to give all bidders a chance to readjust their o¤er, and (ii) rules
pertaining to the formulation of bids in a multiple object context.9
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe our model. Section 3 starts with
benchmark results and then proceeds with our investigation of collusion when the auctioneer is
corrupt. Section 4 contains a discussion of central assumptions and some policy recommendations.
2 The Model
There is a large project denoted 
 to be procured. The project is divided into k di¤erent tasks
indexed with superscript j : !j : We denote S  
 a subset of tasks or a package. There exists
2k   1 possible combinations (packages) of tasks. The packages are indexed with a superscript
h: The government can implement the project at a cost of 1 per task.10 We refer to p (S) = jSj ;
where jSj denotes the number of tasks in package S, as the reservation price:
There are n private rms indexed i = 1; ::n . They have private costs for implementing tasks,
ci : N! R; ci
 
Sh

= ci
 Sh.11 Let ci (x) ; where x = jSj ; denote the cost increment imputable
to the last task in S: Firms cost function are characterized by ci (x) < 1 for x < mi; and
ci (x) > 1; x > mi; for some mi < 1; i = 1; :::; n:12 Following Bernheim and Whinston (1986),
we assume symmetric information among rms: the rmscosts for all packages are known to all
rms, while the auctioneer knows the distribution of the rmscosts only.
The auction procedure views each task as unique. A package is dened as a set of identied tasks,
rather than a quantity of tasks. Thus, an o¤er made by rm i is a collection of bids
 
Sh; phi

where
9A larger share of the corruption cases in e.g. France do pertain to situations where the market is made out of
a number of contracts. In the Les Yvelinnes case mentioned above, 88 construction/maintenance contracts were
simultaneously allocated, and 9 rms were involved, together with civil servants and politicians.
10This assumption is similar to the free disposal assumption in standard auctions.
11This particular cost structure is not critical to any of qualitative results in the paper, and greatly simplies
presentation.
12We do not need to impose more structure on the cost function.
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phi is the minimum price rm i requires for delivering S
h; and is denoted by Bi =
 
Sh; phi
	
h 2k 1 :
Bids belonging to one o¤er are mutually exclusive (such bids are called XOR bids).
We consider a rst-price sealed-bid auction with package bidding. Such auction has some specic
features. In an o¤er, each price bid applies to a bundled set of tasks, e.g., it might be a bid of
$100 on S = f!1; !2g : Such a price bid does not imply any bid on packages f!1g and f!2g : Thus,
an o¤er that addresses all possible packages must include 2k   1 distinct bids. Typically, package
auction rules include no obligation to bid on all packages. In particular, a rm making a bid on a
package does not necessarily submit a bid on the subsets of tasks included in that package. This is
the critical feature that distinguishes our setting from a multiple-unit auction (with interchangeable
tasks). In a multiple-unit auction, bidders submit a supply function.13 We will see that the option
not to bid seriously on all packagesplays an important role in maintaining collusion.14
The role of the auctioneer, i.e. the government agent15 who administers the procedure is to
publicly open the envelopes and select the cost-minimizing collection of packages among submitted
bids under the constraint that all tasks are awarded. By convention, the public rm submits a bid
on each task at price equal to 1. In the case of a tie with the government, the auctioneer must
select the private rm. In the case of a tie between private rms, the auctioneer randomizes with
equal probability. The auctioneer pays the winning rms according to their bid.
Let Si denote i
0s package in the winning collection of packages. We assume that there is no
externality, so that the rm is payo¤ depends solely on Si :
vi = pi (S

i )  ci (Si ) :
Discretionary power
The auctioneer has discretion to decide whether or not to simultaneously o¤er to all rms
an opportunity to readjust their o¤ers, prior to the o¢ cial opening. We refer to this decision as
extending the deadlineor overturning bidsinterchangeably. The decision to overturn the bids
is motivated by alleging a defect in the procedure. We assume that rms and the auctioneer who
13Even if individual tasks are interchangeable, we could use the package auction bidding language. Bidders would
make bids on bundles corresponding to exact quantities (e.g., s tasks in exchange for $100 or nothing). However,
this is not a standard model of a multiple-unit auction. Thus, we assume that tasks are unique. This constrains the
agents choice, but it is not critical to our main argument.
14Bernheim and Whinston (1986, p.6) observe that It appears that ine¢ cient allocations arise from the failure of
bidders to make serious bid on every alternatives.
15The ultimate principal is tax-payers. The agent is a player who has been delegated the power to administer the
allocation procedure (the auctioneer).
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conducts the auction, but not the government, share information about the relevance of the alleged
defect for competition. In our analysis, we focus on those decisions to extend the deadline which are
motivated by the auctioneers self-interest. In the real life, it is of course possible that the deadline
is extended for good reasons.
The auctioneer may be either honest or corrupt. If the auctioneer is honest, his incentives
are perfectly aligned with that of the government, his principal. If he is corrupt, he may abuse
discretion to extract rents. In this case, his payo¤ is equal to the total amount of bribes he receives.
We assume that when the auctioneer is indi¤erent between abusing his discretion and not abusing,
he chooses not to.
The time line of events in the auction game without corruption (alternatively when the auc-
tioneer is honest) is as follows:
Timing
 = 0 : The project 
 =

!j
	k
j=1
is announced, and bidders learn the costs for all packages and
for all rms.
 = 1 : Each rm submits its o¤er, a collection of prices and associated packages, in a sealed
envelope.
 = 2 : The auctioneer selects from among the submitted o¤ers (including the public rms o¤er),
the cost minimizing collection of bids under the constraint that all tasks must be allocated.
The packages from the winning collection are awarded to (one of) the rm(s) that made a
lowest-cost bid. Winners are paid according to their bids.
3 Analysis
3.1 Benchmark
The case when the auctioneer is honest serves as a benchmark. In a single-object rst-price auction
with symmetric information, the problem of e¢ cient allocation entails no subtleties whatsoever:
in equilibrium, the contract goes to a rm that has the lowest costs.16 The equilibrium price
corresponds to the second-lowest cost. In contrast, a multiple-object auction with package bidding
16Suppose that it was not so. Since the equilibrium price pe cannot be lower than the lowest cost, any rm with
lower cost than the winning rm would be better o¤ by o¤ering pe   " for some " > 0 - a contradiction.
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may have multiple equilibria, some of which are ine¢ cient17.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) established a few key results applying to symmetric information
rst-price menu auctions.18 In particular, they show that any rst-price menu auction has a Nash
equilibrium in prot-target strategies,19 which is coalition-proof and yields an e¢ cient allocation.
Formally, let  = fSj ()gnj=1 denote a feasible allocation of tasks. StrategyBi is called an ri prot-
target strategy if for any ; we have Bi (Si ()) = ci (Si ()) + ri. Firms simply bid their cost plus
a mark-up ri:
We start with a lemma. Recall that mi denotes the number of tasks for which rm i has a cost
advantage over the public rm.
Lemma 1 For
Pn
i=1mi  k; there exists a Nash equilibrium of the rst-price multiple-object
package auction that yields a total expenditure equal to k: Otherwise, any Nash equilibrium yields
a total expenditure strictly less than k.
Lemma 1 simply states that when the market is large relative to the private rmssupply of
tasks (priced at p
 
!j

= 1), there exist equilibria where these rms do not compete with each
other. Instead, they bid the reservation price corresponding to the public rms price bid. When
the market is small, i.e.
Pn
i=1mi > k; there exists no partition of the market such that private
rms do not compete with each other. In any equilibrium the average price paid per task is less
that 1. This simple result is the starting point for our investigation: can corruption help bidders
avoid costly competition?
In what follows, we shall assume that
Pn
i=1mi > k; and that the non-cooperative outcome of
the package auction is a prot-target strategy equilibrium. Among these equilibrium allocations, we
denote  the task allocation(s) that maximizes the lowest payo¤ among rms. The corresponding
prot-target strategy equilibrium will be used as the threat point in collusive schemes we investigate.
The analysis focuses on the issue of existence of equilibria in a game extended with corruption where
the bidders collude to share the market at the reserve price. Side transfers between rms are not
allowed.
17Bernheim and Winston (1986) discuss the introduction of uncertainty and conclude that this does not eliminate
the inferior equilibria.
18 In a menu auction, the bidders put their bids on the whole allocation of tasks, while in the package auction they
only bid on their own packages. This distinction is not relevant in our context.
19Bernheim and Whinston (1986) use the term truthful strategy. We opted for a more descriptive term prot-target
strategy introduced by Milgrom (2004).
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3.2 Market-sharing and corruption
We now consider a situation where the auctioneer is corrupt. Our rst objective is to exhibit a
complementarity between the corrupt auctioneers self-interest in extracting rents and the bidders
interest in avoiding competition. To this end, we extend the benchmark model with a corruption
stage. Two cases are of interest. In the rst case the auctioneers discretion conveys no extortion
power. We derive our central complementarity result. In the second case, the auctioneer can also
credibly threaten to disrupt collusion which enables him to appropriate some of the collusive rents.
3.2.1 A complementarity
Informally, the bribing game may be described as follows. The auctioneer opens the envelopes and
learns the content of all o¤ers. If there is a deviator from the collusive agreement, the auctioneer
discloses the currently winning collection of bids to the deviator and some other rm. Thereafter,
he invites the defector and the other informed rm to compete in bribes. The rm that made
the highest bribe o¤er is awarded the right to decidewhether or not to overturn the bids. This
bribing game is intuitively appealing. We shall see that corruption imposes a cost on the defector.
It also keeps the detection risk low. At most two rms are involved in corruption, both with regards
to the disclosure of secrete information and bribery. An additional appeal of this scheme is that
it does not involve any sophisticated (and hazardous) updating of the auctioneers beliefs (about
rmscost). Those beliefs play no role.
Formally, after the project has been announced and the rms learned the costs ( = 0 in
Timing), the game has three stages:
(i) First submission of o¤ers:
Each rm submits its o¤er Bi:
(ii) Corruption game:
a. The auctioneer learns the content of the o¤ers and discloses the winning collection of bids to
two rms (including the defector if any). Or he chooses not to disclose any information in which
case the game moves to (iii).
b. The auctioneer invites the two informed rms to make bribe o¤ers.
c. The auctioneer selects a winner who pays the proposed bribe and decides whether or not to
overturn the o¤ers. If the winner chooses to maintain the o¤ers, the game proceeds to (iii).
d. If the winner decides to overturn the o¤ers, all the rms are invited to resubmit.
(iii) Selection:
8
The auctioneer selects, from among the last submitted o¤ers (including the public rms o¤er),
the cost minimizing collection of bids under the constraint that all tasks must be allocated. The
packages from the winning collection are awarded to the rms that made a lowest bid. The winners
are paid according to their bids.
The above timing denes a multiple-step game. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria char-
acterized by collusion in the procurement auction20.
Denition 1 O¤ers fBci gi=1;:::;n form a market-sharing bidding prole in a rst-price multiple
object package auction if and only if Bci = f(Sci ; pci ) ; (S0i; p0i)g where Sci \ Scj = ; and pci = jSci j ;
i 6= j; i; j = 1; :::; n and p0i > jS0ij for S0i 6= Sci .
Given any partition of the market c = fSci gi=1;:::;n, the corresponding market-sharing strategy
prole maximizes the cartels payo¤. A key feature of a market-sharing o¤er is that it contains a
single seriousbid, the one on the collusive package. Other bids are non-serious: they exceed
the reservation price, and therefore have no chance to be a part of the winning collection.
Let B0 =

B0i
	
i=1;:::;n
denote a prot-target bidding prole relative to  so that vi
 
B0

, i =
1; :::n are payo¤s associated with the equilibrium B0 and let vi
 
B0

= minj 6=i;j=1;::n 1

vj
 
B0
	
;
vi
 
B0

is the lowest non-cooperative payo¤ among the n   i rms. We assume that vi
 
B0

> 0
for all i:
Consider fBci gi=1;:::;n ; a market-sharing strategy prole with vi (Bc)  vi
 
B0

; i = 1; ::; n.
Proposition 1 There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the rst-price multiple object package
auction in which rms play collusive strategies fBci gi=1;:::;n provided that
CORi : vi (B
c)  vi
 bBi;Bc i  vi  B0 ; i = 1; :::; n;
for any o¤er bBi:
Proposition 1 establishes that, subject to the CORi conditions, corruption makes collusive
market-sharing sustainable. First, the corrupt auctioneer makes rmsactions observable by dis-
closing the current winning collection of bids. Second, he o¤ers an opportunity to react to those
20The fact that the auctioneer has incomplete information about rmscost has no implication for the outcome of
the game, i.e., we could as well assume that the knows the costs. What is important is that the auctioneer learns all
the information relevant to his decision as he opens the envelops.
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actions by letting rms inuence his decision on extending the deadline. When the rms play
market-sharing strategies, defection of one bidder implies that some other bidder earns zero payo¤
because his single serious bid is being displaced. Therefore, a displaced bidder has incentives to
bribe the auctioneer to extend the deadline, so he can readjust his o¤er and subsequently earn the
no-collusion payo¤. The deviator also has an incentive to pay a bribe to counter the displaced
bidder, i.e., to avoid that bids are overturn and that rms readjust their o¤er to the competitive
bidding prole. Conditions (COR) yield that for any bidder, the cost of outbidding in bribes any
other bidder is so large that no protable defection exists.21
We already argued that the proposed bribing game has an intuitive appeal in terms of punishing
deviation from the collusive scheme. In the appendix, we show that in the subgame following a
defection, a rst-bribe competition is optimal, and it is optimal to conne bribe competition to
just two rms, one of which is a displaced bidder. A su¢ cient condition for this mechanism to be
an optimal rent-extracting mechanism is that the auctioneers expected payo¤ is maximized when
the auctioneer invites the defector rather than another complying rm to bid against any displaced
bidder. In the Appendix, we show that when it is a common knowledge that vi (Bc)  vj
 
B0

for
all i; j = 1; :::n; it is optimal for the auctioneer to select the defector to participate in the bribing
competition. In an earlier version of the paper we show that a result similar to that in Proposition
1 obtains with an alternative (simple) bribing game.22
Remark 1 The larger is the lowest non-cooperative equilibrium payo¤, the larger is the set of
allocations that can be sustained in a collusive equilibrium.
This result follows immediately from the observation that raising v1
 
B0

= mini=1;:::n

vi
 
B0
	
(weakly) relaxes the COR conditions. Remark 1 points to a feature of the equilibrium in Proposition
1 that may at rst appear counter-intuitive. Indeed, rmsincentive to comply do not rely on the
threat of ending up with their own non-cooperative payo¤: deterrence obtains because the defector
anticipates that he will have to pay a bribe to avoid the non-cooperative outcome.23. The highest
21By assumption a rms cost for a package is a function of the number of tasks only. Hence, if a rm decides to
defect it will displace the bidder who is cheapest to outbid in the bribe auction.
22We considered the following alternative formulation of the corruption game: the auctioneer discloses the o¤ers
to a displaced bidder (if any) and makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er: he o¤ers to extend the deadline in exchange for a
bribe equal to z. If the rm rejects the o¤er, the auctioneer proceeds to the o¢ cial opening. It is easy to show that
for z  v1
 
B0

mini=1;:::n

vi
 
B0
	
collusion is an equilibrium of the game.
23The non-cooperative payo¤ might be obtained only in the subgame following a defection where the bribe exceeds
the di¤erence between the defection payo¤ and the non-cooperative payo¤.
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bribe that the displaced bidder is willing to pay to overturn the initial o¤ers is equal to his non-
cooperative payo¤. Hence, the larger is the lowest non-cooperative payo¤ , the larger is the bribe
needed to outbid the bidder who is the cheapest to displace, and consequently the smaller is
the set of collusive allocations that can be sustained. Corruption modies the role played by the
threat equilibrium in the cartel. The decision to revertto the non-cooperative equilibrium is an
outcome of competition in bribes. What matters to incentives in collusion is the price that must
be paid to control that decision.
Remark 1 provides some motivation for our selection of the threat equilibrium. We know from
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) that a prot-target equilibrium always exist and although they are
not the only stable equilibria, the prot-target equilibrium outcomes are the only stable outcomes.
Milgrom (2004) shows (Theorem 8.7) that prot-target strategy equilibria of the rst-price package
auction correspond to competitive equilibria allocations that maximize public expenditures, which
reects the biddersadvantage of making the o¤ers.
3.2.2 Equilibrium corruption
In Proposition 1, corruption is a necessary ingredient for sustaining a collusive ring. However,
bribery always happens out of the equilibrium path. In equilibrium, no defection occurs as the
rms correctly predict each others behavior, and so the auctioneers rents are equal to 0. As such,
our theory fails to explain the occurrence of bribery in procurement. Still, our view is that in situ-
ations where both collusion and corruption are present, equilibrium bribes often are a secondary
phenomenon that can be explained fairly easily once we pinned down the role of corruption in
sustaining collusion. To show this, we note that the zero-equilibrium-bribe result hinges upon the
assumption that extending the deadline is costly for the auctioneer.24 As a consequence, in the
subgame where no rm deviates, the auctioneer cannot extract any rent. The threat of extending
the deadline is not credible.
Next, we consider a slight variation of the model which assumes that the auctioneer incurs no
cost when extending the deadline. As a consequence, he can threaten to overturn the bids even
in the case of a successful market-sharing. Let stage (ii) of the corruption game be modied as
follows:
(a) The auctioneer learns the content of the o¤ers and discloses the winning collection of bids
24This cost is normalized to zero. Still, it plays a role as we assume that when the auctioneer is indi¤erent, he
chooses not to extend the deadline.
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to two rms (including the defector if any). Or he discloses no information in which case the game
moves to (iii).
(b) The auctioneer invites the two informed rms to make a bribe o¤er and the game moves to
(c). Otherwise, he requests a conventionalbribe from both25; the rms either pay or refuse to pay.
The auctioneer decides whether to maintain the bids, and the game moves to (iii). Alternatively,
the auctioneer overturns the bids, and all rms are invited to readjust their o¤ers.
(c) The winner of the bribe auction pays his bribe bid and decides whether or not to keep the
submitted bids unchanged. If the winner chooses to maintain the bids, the game proceeds to (iii).
If the winner decides to extend the deadline, all rms are invited to readjust their o¤ers.
Stage (iii), the selection stage, is as before.
As above, let B0 =

B0i
	
i=1;:::;n
denote the prot-target bidding prole relative to , and
let fBci gi=1;2 with vi (Bc)   t  vi
 
B0

; i = 1; :::; n be a market-sharing strategy prole where
t  0 denotes the conventional bribe, which we assume to be a common knowledge.
Proposition 2 There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the rst-price multiple-object package
auction in which rms play the collusive strategies fBci gi=1;:::;n provided that
(CORi ) : vi (B
c)  t  vi
 bBi;Bc i  vi  B0 ; i 6= j; i; j = 1; :::; n:
for any o¤er bBi: In equilibrium, the auctioneer earns a total bribe income equal to 2t:
In the equilibrium described in Proposition 2, collusion is always accompanied by bribery. A
rm pays the conventional bribe to maintain collusive o¤ers under the auctioneers credible threat
that he would overturn the o¤ers, which would induce a readjustment to the competitive outcome.
On the other hand, defection from the collusive strategy is deterred by the same mechanism as in
Proposition 1.
It is possible to propose a number of extensions of the basic setup that yield results similar to
that in Proposition 2. For instance, we might allow the auctioneer to alert a supervisory agency.
Indeed, when practitioners talk about silence money, they typically refer to bribes paid to the
auctioneer when he refrains from reporting about non-serious bids that indicate collusion.
25Evidence (e.g. coming from court cases or TIs Bribe Payers Surveys; www.transparency.org) suggests that bribes
in public procurement have a conventional character. In France, it is common that bribes correspond from 2 to 3
percent of the value of a construction contract. In South East Asia, bribes can amount to up to 10 percent of the
value of an international procurement contract.
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3.3 Package bidding and collusion
This section aims at illustrating the role of package bidding in facilitating collusive market-sharing
in procurement tenders. For this purpose, we compare the vulnerability to collusion of the package
auction with that of a rst-price multiple-object auction with single-item bidding. In view of
the limited objective of this section, we make the comparison in a simpler environment: costs are
assumed to be additive: ci
 
Sh

=
P
!j2Sh ci
 
!j

. Since costs are attached to specied tasks rather
than a number of tasks, we denote 
i =

!j ; ci
 
!j
  1	 and assume that [ni=1
i = 
; so all tasks
can be produced at a cost not exceeding the reservation price (corresponding to the public rms
production).
A single-item bid auction is dened as follows. Each rm (including the public rm) submits an
o¤er, which is a collection of non-exclusive single-item bids, in a sealed envelope. The auctioneer
selects the cost minimizing collection of bids under the constraint that all tasks must be allocated.
The tie-breaking rules are the same as before: in a tie with the public rm, a private rm is selected.
In a tie between private rms, the auctioneer randomizes.
Lemma 2 In the additive cost environment, the Nash equilibrium of the rst-price multiple
object auction with single-item bidding is unique and yields an e¢ cient allocation i
 
!j

=
argmini=1;:::;n ci
 
!j

with p
 
!j

= mini6=i; i=1;:::;n ci
 
!j

: When 
i \ 
j 6= ? for some
i 6= j; i; j = 1; :::; n; P p  !j < k:
The allocation of each task can be viewed as an independent rst-price auction. When the set
of tasks for which two rms have a cost advantage of the public rm overlap, the equilibrium price
is below the reservation price.
Denition 2 O¤ers fBci gni=1 form a market-sharing bidding prole in a rst-price single-item
auction if Bci =

!j ; pji

j=1;::k

; pji = 1 for !
j 2 Sci and pj > 1 for !j =2 Sci with Sci \Sck = ;; for
i = 1; :::; n :
Despite the similarities with the market-sharing strategies of the rst-price package auction,
it turns out to be more di¢ cult to sustain collusion with single-item bidding. To demonstrate
that, we extend the single-item auction with a corruption game identical to the one introduced in
Subsection 3.2.1. Let B0 denote the non-cooperative equilibrium strategy prole, and let vi
 
B0

be dened as above. Let fBci gi=1;:::n, vi (Bc)  vi
 
B0

; i = 1; :::; n be a market-sharing strategy
prole
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Proposition 3 There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the rst-price multiple object single
item auction in which the rms play the collusive strategies fBci gi=1;:::;n provided that
(COR0i) : vi (B
c)  vi
 bBi; Bc i maxn0; vi  B0  vj  bBi; Bc io
i 6= j; i; j = 1; :::; n for any o¤er bBi:
We immediately see that (COR) conditions are more restrictive than the corresponding (COR)
conditions in Proposition 1: the second term in the bracket on the right-hand side includes the neg-
ative term vj
 bBi; Bc i : This negative term is the main di¤erence between the two auction formats
with respect to their vulnerability to collusion. In the package auction, the market-sharing strate-
gies are designed so as to give maximum incentives for a displaced bidder to bribe the auctioneer:
in the absence of readjustments, he earns a payo¤ of zero: vj

Bci ;
bB i = 0. Such strategies are
not available in the auction with single-item bidding as tasks are not bundled into packages. When
a defector (j)s bid and the collusive bid of a bidder (i) overlap, the displaced bidder (i) generally
wins some of the tasks belonging to his collusive package. If bids are maintained, those tasks are
paid at the high collusive price vi
 bBj ; Bc j  0.. Therefore, he may not be willing to pay much
in bribes to overturn the bids and readjust to the competitive equilibrium. This makes defection
more protable and reduces the set of equilibria with collusion compared with that of the package
auction.26
The main lesson we derive from this exercise is that while package bidding is potentially ef-
ciency improving as suggested by both theoretical and experimental works (e.g., Cybernomics
2000, Ausubel and Milgrom 2002 and Ausubel, Crampton and Milgrom 2005), the exibility of the
package auction may have a substantial ip side. Rules designed to improve allocation e¢ ciency
can be exploited to defeat competition. With package bidding, this happens as the larger set of
bidding strategies allows bidders to select o¤ers that imply a credible threat of retaliation in re-
sponse to defection from a collusive agreement. The key issue revealed by our comparison with the
single-item auction is that, with package bidding, rms may choose not to make serious sub-package
bids. Our ndings are consistent with remarks concerning the risks connected with exibility of
other rules in procurement. One example of such a situation was discussed in connection with the
FCC package auction design. Plott and Salmon (2000) argue that the right to withdraw bids opens
up gaming opportunities detrimental to competition.
26 In a working paper version, we proposed a numerical example where collusion is sustainable with package bidding,
but not with single-item bidding.
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4 Discussion and Policy Recommendations
Assumptions Our main result, in Proposition 1, relies on several critical assumptions: (i) The
auctioneer has some discretion to give all rms a chance to readjust their o¤er; (ii) the auctioneer
knows the content of the o¤ers; and (iii) the auctioneers objective is to extract rents. We discuss
them in turn.
(i) There is ample evidence of discretionary rules in procurement laws and guidelines that, in
e¤ect, give the auctioneer the right to let rms readjust their o¤ers before the o¢ cial opening. These
rules are motivated by the consideration that the auctioneer may privately observe an ambiguity
in some tender document or learn that some rm has an undue information advantage. One of the
objectives of competitive public procurement procedures is to secure fair and erce competition.
The auctioneer is therefore expected to intervene to clear ambiguities (remove undue information
advantage) and to o¤er rms an opportunity to readjust their o¤er when needed. In addition, it
has been argued that such rules help combating favoritism.27
(ii) It might seem problematic to assume that the auctioneer knows the content of the o¤ers so
he can disclose it. Indeed, a main rule of public procurement auctions is that no one should have
access to that information before the o¢ cial opening. However, there is empirical evidence that
procurement o¢ cials have been able to learn the o¤ers before the o¢ cial opening. One example is
in the court case concerned with the construction of the High Speed line North in France (Cartier-
Bresson, 1998).28
(iii) The assumption on self-interest is supported by widespread empirical evidence of corruption
in procurement around the world (see e.g., Transparency International Global Report, 2002).
The analysis is performed in the context of a single auction. Yet, it is often argued that
collusion in public tenders is enforced by repeated interaction and thus there is no enforcement role
for corruption to play. There are both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggesting that
corruption also can play an important role in a context where interaction between rms is repeated.
A rst argument is that there is often signicant uncertainty and variation in the protability of
future contracts. This creates tensions in the cartel. This kind of problem is similar to the one
encountered by a price cartel when the market is subject to demand shocks (see e.g., Green and
27Yet another rationale for such rules can be found in the seminal paper by Milgrom and Weber (1982). They show
that the auctioneer can reduce his expenditure by improving biddersinformation on a common value component.
28An SNCF (French Railroad) agent was convicted for having opened and disclosed the content of o¤ers to members
of a cartel. He also gave them two (?!) opportunities to readjust their o¤er.
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Porter 1984, Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico 2004). In procurement, relying on corruption may turn
out to be an optimal solution when uncertainty about the protability of future contracts is large.
A second argument appeals to the corrupt auctioneers own interests: by helping avoid competition
he contributes to creating rents that he can appropriate. This is best illustrated by the case of
Les Yvelinnesmentioned in the Introduction. The details of the judgment clearly show that a
corrupt politician and civil servants initiated and arbitrated the cartel. They selected the rms that
were to participate. They divided the market among the rms. And they punished deviators.29
The collusive scheme relied primarily on corruption despite repeated interaction between the rms.
It appears that the same patterns are encountered in the earlier mentioned corruption/collusion
case in the procurement of the Paris City Halls construction projects. Nine of Frances largest
construction rms (including Bouygues, Dumez, SGE, SAEP etc..) are involved. Those rms have
been interacting for decades in procurement tenders.
Policy recommendations The main insight from our analysis is that in multiple-object tenders
corruption and collusion exhibit strategic complementarity.30 In particular, seemingly innocuous
details in the tendering procedures can be exploited to defeat competition. A second result is that
package bidding, a feature of auction design aimed at enhancing e¢ ciency, can facilitate collusion.
A third result is that, in the presence of corruption, collusion is easier among rms that are not too
close competitors. It should be noted that while the analysis has been performed in the context
of public procurement, similar features are encountered in private procurement. In that context,
we talk about fraud rather than corruption when referring to the procurement agents abuse of his
position in the rm.
Our most important message to auction designers in public procurement is that risks of collusion
and risks of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. This message extends to control agencies.
Often (e.g., in France) collusion issues are handled by a competition authority while corruption
cases are addressed by criminal courts. This institutional separation makes it di¢ cult to e¤ectively
unveil and prosecute many cases when collusion and corruption are closely entangled. The analysis
29This was made possible by communicating selectively an information that could be used to formulate a winning
bid. In case a bidder deviated (tried to obtain more), the information could however be made worthless by the
politician.
30We use the term strategic complemenetarity in a looser sense: Consider a much simplied version of our game
formulated with zero/one decisions follows: playing corrupt (1) or not (0) and colluding (1) or not (0). We see that
such a game would exhibit a more standard form of strategic complementarity.
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entails that a close cooperation between competition authorities and criminal court is warranted.
Alternatively, criminal investigators dealing with corruption in procurement should have a solid
education in the economics of auction.
Our analysis suggests that the government should reduce the procurement agents discretion
and/or make him more accountable. More precisely this concerns features of the procedural design
that in e¤ect give the agent an opportunity to let rms readjust their o¤er. Yet, these features
o¤er some valuable exibility one often wishes to preserve. The policy should therefore target
abuses rather than discretion as such. To this aim we believe that raising the level of competence
of procurement agents is key. A highly competent agent can be made accountable for ambiguities
and other defects in the bidding documents. On the other hand, strict accountability mitigates
the agents incentives to reveal private information about defects. Therefore, it might be counter-
productive from the point of view of the ght against favoritism.
These conicting arguments reveal a more general feature: namely, that measures aimed at com-
bating favoritism can facilitate collusion and vice-versa31, which provides an additional argument
in support of our main conclusion that the issues of corruption and collusion must be addressed
simultaneously. Our view is that strict accountability for the quality of the tendering documents
is warranted. On the other hand, information about defaults in bidding documents favoring some
rms could be generated in a mechanism that uses rmsprivate information. Indeed, the typical
case is that rms would know (or suspect) that one of their competitor is being favored. The
characterization of a mechanism that uses rmsprivate information to combat favoritism is on our
future research agenda.
Another immediate recommendation is to limit the use of package bidding to situations where
signicant complementarities are expected. Where the patterns of complementarity are similar
among rms, ex-ante bundling of objects may be preferable. However, when the patterns are
di¤erent ex-ante bundling by the auctioneer generates a risk of favoritism: the auctioneer can
bundle tasks to favor one rm. The analysis of the single-item bid auction reveals that it is because
the rms fail to make serious sub-package bids that collusion is easier to sustain with package
bidding. Hence, a recommendation is that a package bidding procedure requires that any package
31Another example concerns the secrecy of a reserve price or evaluation rule. The French Competition authoritys
contribution to the debate on the new procuremnt code included a fervent defence for secrecy of the evaluation rule
- because it creates coordination problem for a cartel. When taking into account corruption, secrecy appears as a
source of rents for the agent that can be realized either in favoritism or in support of the cartel.
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bid also includes serious sub-package bids.32 That may not always be feasible however as there
may exist signicant costs associated with the evaluation of the sub-packages.
Finally, the results in remark 1 suggest that procurement and control agencies should be par-
ticularly vigilant to the risk of collusion and corruption when competition between rms is not
too erce. This corresponds to situations when the market is characterized by a small number of
medium size (relatively to the public market) rms of comparable e¢ ciency. Interestingly, we see
that when enforcement of the ring is secured by corruption the analysis suggests a quite di¤erent
characterization of high risk markets compared to the one arising from standard analysis. The
standard result yields that cet. par. the risks of collusion are highest when competition between
rms is erce.
32The IBM-Mars auction and the London bus auction used procedures with single items bids plus specied discounts
for certain packages (see Milgrom (2004) p.315).
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
i. Consider the case when
Pn
i=1mi  k: Then there exists a task allocation  = fSi gni=1 ; with Si \
Sj = ? and jSi j = mi for all i; j = 1; :::; n i 6= j; and such that [ni=1Si  
: Dene ri = mi ci (Si )
the prot target of rm i. The collection of o¤ers fBi gni=1 ; Bi =
 
Sh; ph
	2k 1
h=1
where ph =
c
 
Sh

+ ri ; constitutes a Nash equilibrium. It yields a total cost equal to k:
We rst show that  is an allocation that minimizes the total cost of the project when rms
play the above described prot target strategies. For any Sh such that
Sh > mi; ph = c  Sh  
ci (S

i ) + mi > m
h because ci (x) > 1 for x > mi so this bid is not competitive against the
public rm. For Sh such that
Sh < mi; we also have ph = c  Sh   ci (Si ) + mi > mh since
ci (mi)   c
 
Sh

< mi   mh so even that bid is not competitive against the public rm. By
construction, pi (Si ) = c (S

i )   ci (Si ) + mi = mi so these are the only bids not dominated by
those of the public rm. By assumption, in case of tie with the public rm the auctioneer selects
the private rm.
For packages larger than mi; rm is marginal cost is lower than its marginal revenue, which is
equal to 1 per unit and above mi the marginal cost is higher than the marginal revenue. Hence,
Bi =
 
Sh; ph
	2k 1
h=1
where ph = c
 
Sh

+ ri is optimal for the rms.
ii. Assume now
Pn
i=1mi > k: Then any equilibrium task allocation 
 = fSi gni=1 must be
characterized by jSi j = qi < mi for some i. Assume further that pj

Sj

=
Sj  j = 1:::; n (as
before). Then rm i has an incentive deviate and o¤er bBi with bSi = Si [! at price bp = jSi [ !j ":
The new bid must be part of the equilibrium allocation since it is cheaper than the competitorsbids
which price the tasks at the reserve price. And, since ci (x) < 1; for x < mi; we have vi (Bi ) <
vi
 bBi so the deviation is protable. Hence, whenPni=1mi > k we must havePni=1 pi (Si ) < k in
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume common knowledge of a standing partition c: The following strategies form a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium:
The auctioneers strategy
i. In case of no defection from collusive bidding disclose no information and proceed with the
o¢ cial opening. In case of defection disclose the winning collection of bids to the defector and one
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of the displaced rms;
ii. Invite the two informed rms to bid in bribes and award the right to decide" (hereafter
rtd) to the highest bribe bidder.
Firm is strategy, i = 1; :::; n
i. Submit the marketsharing o¤er corresponding to the standing partition;
ii. If the disclosed o¤ers reveal no defection, wait for the o¢ cial opening. If the o¤ers reveal a
defection,
iii. Submit a bribe bid bi = min

vi
 
B0

; V def
	
where V def is dened below.
iv. If the initial o¤ers are overturned, submit the non-cooperative Nash o¤er B0i .
We next show that these strategies are part of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the rst-
price package auction with corruption. We start with the corruption game. The selection stage is
mechanic.
Corruption game
d. By construction B0i is a best response to B
0
 i so if initial o¤ers are overturned, it is optimal
for bidder i = 1; :::n to readjust to B0i :
c. Let i and j be the two rms invited to bid in bribes and assume they submit bi; bj such that
bi > bj : Clearly, the auctioneer maximizes his bribe income when awarding the rtd to i in exchange
for bi:
b. Several cases may present themselves. We may be in a subgame where the disclosed o¤ers
revealed no defection. In that case the bidders earn vi (Bc) if the bids are maintained while they
earn vi
 
B0

if the the bids are overturned. Since vi (Bc) > vi
 
B0

i = 1; :::n all rms prefer the
o¤ers to be maintained. Since no extension is the outcome that the auctioneer chooses by default,
the rtd has no value for the rms and it is indeed optimal to wait for the o¢ cial opening.
Consider now a subgame where bidder j defected. When bidder j defects, he submits an
o¤er Bdef ;
 
Sdef ; pdef

; with vj

Bdef ;Bc j

> vj (B
c) : Since
Pm
i=1mi > k; this implies that
Sdef \ Sci 6= ;; for some i 6= j : the defector displaces some bidder(s) i0s collusive bid. We rst
note that any non-displaced bidder including the defector prefers the bids not to be overturned
vi

Bdef ;Bc j

 vi (Bc) > vi
 
B0

: So if the second selected rm is not a displaced rm, there
is no conict of interest with the deviator and both submit zero bribes. In contrast rm i whose
single serious bid has been displaced earns vi

Bdef ;Bc j

= 0 when the o¤ers are maintained. If
the deadline is extended, it readjusts and earns the non-cooperative payo¤ vi
 
B0
  vi  B0 > 0:
We now focus on the case where one of the informed rms is a displaced rm labelled 2 and the
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other the deviator labelled 1. Let V denote the value of the rtd: V 1 = v1
 bB1;Bc 1  v1  B0 and
V 2 = v2
 
B0

: The outcome of the rst-bribe auction is
i. For V 1  V 2; b2 = V 2; b = b2 = V 2; where b = b1 = b2: By convention the highest value
bidder wins He pays the second highest value. Bidder 1 decides not to extend. In case of tie in
values (and bribes) the displaced bidder wins.
ii. For V 1 < V 2; b1 = V 1; b = b2 = V 1; the displaced bidder wins and decides to extend.
Since the auctioneer earns no bribe when he informs (about the winning collection) a non-
displaced bidder as the second rm, while he earns at least min

V 1; V 2
	
> 0 when informing a
displaced bidder (in addition to the deviator), it is optimal for him to select a displaced bidder.
First submission stage
Given the equilibrium outcomes in the subgames following the rst submission stage rm j
knows that if it defects, it will compete in the bribe auction with a displaced bidder. By condition
(CORj) : vj (Bc)  vj
 bBj ;Bc j   vj  B0 ; for all i so b > V def and there exists no protable
defection.
Hence, under conditions (CORi) i = 1; ::n, the market-sharing bidding strategy prole Bc is
part of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the auction game extended with corruption.
Optimality of the bribing mechanism
We now assume that the auctioneer is free to choose any mechanism he wants to sell his rtd
under the constraint that the defector be given a chance to bid in bribe. We rst show that when
only two rms can be involved in corruption, the rst-price auction is optimal subject to self-
enforceability. Next we show that restricting the number of bidder to two is optimal. Finally, we
give a condition securing that inviting the deviator to bid in bribes is optimal.
i. In the subgame following defection, the defector and any of the displaced bidders have
opposite interests with respect to the decision. Since the rtd has no value to the auctioneer, either
imposing a reserve bribe strictly larger than zero or a bias in favor of one of the bidders is not
ex-post incentive compatible for the auctioneer. Since the bidders know each others value, the
most the auctioneer can extract is the second highest value and a rst bribe auction achieves that.
ii. The auctioneer could choose to invite three or more rms to bid in bribes. But there are
only two outcomes maintain the bids and overturn the bids. All displaced bidders share an
interest for overturning the bids while all non-displaced bidders share an interest for maintaining
them. It is easy to see that if two displaced bidders compete with the defector bidder, we have
a free-riding problem. Both displaced bidders would prefer the other guy to pay for maintaining
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the bids. This is a standard problem which yields a mixed strategy equilibrium characterized by
ine¢ ciency. When both displaced bidders value the rtd more than the defector, they may still fail
to win. So the auctioneers expected revenue is lower than if only one displaced bidder was present.
Under conditions CORi the displaced bidders do not have a value for the rtd lower than that of
the defector.
iii. Ideally, the auctioneer would like to invite the highest value displaced bidder and let him
compete with the highest value non-displaced bidder.
We rst note that the identity of the displaced bidder has no implication for the result in propo-
sition 1 which must hold for the lowest non-cooperative payo¤. The auctioneers own incentive to
select a displaced bidder with a high NE payo¤only strengthens the deterrence power of corruption.
In contrast the selection from among non-displaced bidders has a crucial implication for the result.
There can be no equilibrium with collusion where it is ex-post optimal for the auctioneer to invite
a complying rm rather than the defector to compete in bribe.
We know from above that b = V 2 when V 1  V 2 i.e., v1
 bB1;Bc 1   v1  B0  V 2 =
v2
 
B0

: By the COR conditions we know that vi (Bc)  vi
 bBi;Bc i  vi  B0 : So we have that
V 1  V 2 ) v1 (Bc)  v2
 
B0

: Hence, if vi (Bc)  vj
 
B0

for all i; j = 1; :::n it is indeed optimal
for the auctioneer to invite the deviator to bid in bribes.
Proof of proposition 2
Assume common knowledge of a standing partition c and of a conventional bribe t; and consider
the following strategies:
The auctioneers strategy
i. When no rm defects, he discloses the winning collection of bids to any two rms and asks
them to pay the conventional bribe. He overturns the initial bids unless both rms pay t:
ii. In case of deviation from collusive bidding, he discloses the submitted o¤ers to the deviator
and a displaced bidder, and asks for bribe o¤ers. He awards the rtd to the highest bribe bidder.
Firm is strategy, i = 1; ::n
i. Submit the market-sharing o¤er corresponding to the standing partition;
ii. If the disclosed o¤ers reveal no defection, pay the conventional bribe if the auctioneer asks
for it: Otherwise dont pay. If the disclosed o¤ers reveal that some rm defected,
iii. submit a bribe bid bi = min

vi
 
B0

; V def
	
where V def is dened as in the proof of
proposition 1 above.
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iv. If initial bids are overturned, submit the non-cooperative Nash o¤er B0i .
We next show that these strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of the auction
game extended with corruption.
Corruption game
The arguments at steps e,d, are similar to the ones in proposition 1 at steps d and c.
c. At step c we are in a subgame where the informed rms have been asked to pay a bribe.
For the case where the disclosed bids revealed no defection, the rms face a coordination game like
situation when deciding whether or not to pay. According to the auctioneers equilibrium strategy
if both rms pay the o¤ers are maintained and the o¢ cial auction outcome yields vi (Bc) i =
1; :::; n. While if one or both rms fail to pay, the o¤ers are overturned which yields a payo¤ of
vi
 
B0

i = 1; :::; n: Since vi (Bc)  t > vi
 
B0

i = 1; :::; n both rms prefer to pay to maintain the
bids. The rmsstrategy entails paying if and only if the auctioneer asks for the conventional bribe
t. This solves the coordination problem. In the equilibrium of this subgame both rms pay if and
only if they are asked for t.
Consider now the subgame where a deviation has been uncovered but the auctioneer asks for
the conventional bribe. The displaced bidder wants the o¤ers to be overturned so he does not pay.
Since the deviator who would like the bids to be maintained cannot a¤ect the situation he does not
pay either. No bribes are paid and the bids are overturned.
b. In the subgame where a rm deviated the auctioneer earns nothing when asking for the
conventional bribe while he can earn at least min

V 1; V 2
	
(as dened in the proof of Proposition
1 above) when inviting the informed rms to make bribe o¤ers so he chooses to do so. In the
subgame where all rms submitted the market-sharing o¤ers, he earns nothing when asking the
rms to compete in bribes while he earns 2t when asking for the conventional bribe so it is optimal
to do so.
a. For the same reasons as in proposition 1 in the subgame where a defection occurred the
auctioneer discloses the o¤ers to the deviator and a displaced bidder. In the subgame where all
rms complied, it plays no role which rms he informs since we assume that vi (Bc)  t  vi
 
B0

:
First submission stage
By the reasoning above rm i knows that if it defects, it will be invited to bid in bribe.
By condition (CORi ) : vi (B
c)   t  vi
 bBi; Bc i  vi  B0 ; i = 1; :::; n and so there exists no
protable defection. The market-sharing bidding strategy prole Bc and the payment of the con-
ventional bribe are part of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the auction game extended with
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corruption.
Proof of lemma 2
Firm is payo¤-if-win Sh is given
vi
 
Sh

=
P
!j2Sh

pi
 
!j
  ci  !j ; i = 1; ::n:
This function is fully separable in the net income from each individual task. Hence, rms
view bidding for each task as a separate auction. Each of these auctions are single-item rst-price
symmetric information auction (except for the public rm that always bid 1). The outcome is
therefore i
 
!j

= argmini=0;:::;n ci
 
!j

: The winner is paid the second lowest cost unless the
winner is the public rm which is compensated with 1 par task. The equilibrium price is given
p
 
!j

= mini6=i;i=1;:::;n ci
 
!j

which is strictly less than 1 for 
i \
j 6= ? since ci(j) (!k) < 1 for
!k 2 
i(j). A rms equilibrium o¤er is the collection of the unique single-item equilibrium bids.
Proof of Proposition 3
The argument is identical to the one in the proof of proposition 1, except for the determination of
displaced biddersvalue of the rtd. In the subgame where rm j defected and submitted Sdef 6=
Scj ; p
 
Sdef
  Sdef  : By Pni=1mi > k; we have Sdef \ Sci 6= ; for at least one rm i: So we have
Sdisi = S
c
i n
 
Sdef \ Sci

and vi

Bdef ;Bc j

=
P
!j2Sdis
 
1  ci
 
!j
  0:
In the subgame where defection occurred a displaced bidder is value for the rtd is V dis =
max
n
0; vi
 
B0
  vi Bdef ;Bc jo :
By the same argument as in proposition 1, no bidder has any incentive to defect at the rst
submission stage when vi
 bBi; Bcj vi (Bc)  max0; vi  B0  vi  Bdef ; Bci 	 : The bribe needed
to outbid the displaced bidder is so large that no defection is protable.
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